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Abstract  
This article explores Islamic politics in two Muslim-majority countries in Southeast 
Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, by linking their trajectories, from late colonial 
emergence to recent upsurge, to broad concerns of political economy, including 
changing social bases, capitalist transformation, state policies, and economic crises. 
The Indonesian and Malaysian trajectories of Islamic politics are tracked in a 
comparative exercise that goes beyond the case studies to suggest that much of 
contemporary Islamic politics cannot be explained by reference to Islam alone, but to 
how Islamic identities and agendas are forged in contexts of modern and profane 
social contestation. 
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For all its claims to prescribe for social and individual as well as political behavior, the 
variety of practices in Islamic countries suggests that ‘Islam’ as such cannot explain 
how Muslims behave, or how they might/ought to behave. Other factors outside ‘Islam’ 
must be invoked. The resort to an all-explanatory ‘Islam’ is therefore circular. 
Moreover, these ‘Muslims’, as much as the rest of us, have multiple identities, the 
relative balance and character of which change over time .… The study of Islamic 
communities cannot be based on a ‘sociology of religion’ alone; it must, rather, involve 
a sociology of how religion interacts with other ethnic, cultural and political forces 
(Halliday 1995: 75). 
 
 
When al-Banna saw the British living in luxury in the Suez Canal Zone, he was moved 
to tears by the contrast with the miserable hovels of the Egyptian workers. He saw this 
as a religious problem that needed an Islamic solution. Where Christians would often 
respond to the challenge of modernity by a reassertion of doctrine, Muslims have 
responded by making a social or political effort (jihad) (Armstrong 2000: 133). 
 
 
 
This article explores Islamic politics in two Muslim-majority countries in Southeast 
Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, by linking their trajectories from late colonial emergence to 
recent upsurge to broad concerns of political economy. The Indonesian and Malaysian 
trajectories of Islamic politics are tracked in a comparative exercise that goes beyond the 
case studies to suggest that much of contemporary Islamic politics cannot be explained by 
reference to Islam alone, but to how Islamic identities and agendas are forged in contexts of 
modern and profane social contestation.  
 
The Indonesian and Malaysian trajectories, from their colonial starting-points, 
diverged at important points with consequences for the character and role of Islamic 
politics. A key divergence appeared when Islamic politics in Indonesia was expressed 
through parties and parliaments soon after independence, amidst a tumultuous process of 
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post-colonial state building that included insurgencies. In contrast, the comparatively 
smooth establishment of the post-colonial state in Malaysia more easily incorporated 
Islamic politics. With subsequent capitalist transformation and integration with processes of 
globalization, Islamic politics provided an ideological resource for articulating social and 
political discontent in both countries. Yet Indonesia’s authoritarian state brutally 
‘demobilized’ any such discontent until Soeharto’s New Order itself was overthrown in 
1998 while the state’s official Islamization in Malaysia managed and constrained Islamic 
dissent until it was revived between two political crises of capitalism. A major outcome of 
the state and capitalist transformations that altered the socio-political landscapes of 
Indonesia and Malaysia was the emergence of new Islamic populism rooted in cross-class 
social bases. 
 
 
I. Islamic politics: central issues 
 
  At least three reasons make it timely to examine how Islamic politics in Indonesia 
and Malaysia has changed as part of deeper socio-economic and political transformations.   
 
First, since Southeast Asia emerged after ‘September 11’ as a ‘second front’ in the 
USA’s so-called ‘war on terror’, the literature on Islamic politics, particularly in Indonesia 
but also in Malaysia, has been dominated by security concerns over ‘Islamic radicalization’ 
(Gunaratna 2002), the ‘Talibanization’ of Southeast Asia (Singh 2009) and issues of 
terrorism and violence. Academia, policy-making circles and the mass media are awash 
with discussions of purported links between Indonesian and Malaysian ‘Islamic terror 
cells’,1 and between Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda, that connect ‘radicals’ in the two 
countries to Middle Eastern Wahabi money and ideology (Abuza 2003; 2007). 
Overshadowing this discursive development is a securitization of the study of Islamic 
politics by researchers who narrowly focus on such matters as pro-Sharia resurgence, 
terrorist bombings and anti-Western declamations. This preoccupation with the symptoms 
and not the social causes of shifts in Islamic politics hints of a hijack of the field of study. 
Motivating it is apprehension that organized forces of ‘Islamic radicalism’ – understood as 
an ideology and a movement that wants to establish an Islamic state hostile to ‘free 
                                                            
1 A few Malaysian citizens were implicated in high-profile bombings in Indonesia, most recently in July 2009.  
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markets’, democracy, and ‘the West’ – may capture state power directly by electoral means 
or indirectly via the radicalization of the ummah (Muslim community).  In common with 
Hamilton-Hart (2005) and Sidel (2007), we regard the security-oriented discourse as being 
littered with prognostications of the future of Islamic politics that are misleadingly alarmist 
especially when Islamic dissent in Indonesia and Malaysia has overwhelmingly abided by 
the rules of secular state authority. 
 
Second, there is a tendency to monitor Islamic politics by distinguishing between 
‘moderate’ (or ‘liberal’) and ‘radical’ (or ‘hard-line’) Muslims. Even if this distinction 
serves to stress that Muslims are mostly ‘moderate’ (Barton 2004), it belongs with an old 
debate over varieties of Islam (differentiated culturally or doctrinally) that pitted a plural 
peripheral ‘Southeast Asian Islam’ against a rigid core ‘Middle Eastern Islam’. Thus Islam 
in Indonesia, despite the sporadic violence of Muslim militants, is held up as an exemplar 
of moderation, and Indonesia hailed as a country in which Islam and democracy co-exist 
admirably. Likewise, despite the unrelieved conservatism of its Islamic officialdom, 
Malaysia is touted as proof that Muslim nations can overcome economic backwardness by 
engaging with global capitalism. But separating ‘good Muslims’ from ‘bad Muslims’, as 
Mamdani (2002) has pithily put it, is flawed and forlorn, being premised on nothing more 
solid than their respective acceptance or rejection of Western security concerns and global 
capitalism.  
 
Third, when compelled to explain why plural forms of Islam in the broader region 
have been challenged by ‘fundamentalist’ tendencies, observers of Islamic culture and 
politics proffer elaborate accounts of a ‘battle of ideas’, not between an imagined 
homogenous Muslim community and a simplistic Huntingtonian ‘Western Civilization’, 
but rather between the aforementioned ‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’ within Muslim 
communities. This scenario, by tracing ‘radicalism’ to the doctrinal influences and financial 
resources of external sponsors of religious fundamentalism – Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia 
at different times – confers a certain ‘exceptionalism’ on ‘Southeast Asian Islam’: as it 
were, malignant foreign influences account for the rise of abnormally radical tendencies in 
its midst (Abuza 2003). Such a perspective, however, offers no advance on a distinguished 
academic literature that relates the belief systems and socio-cultural life of Muslim 
communities in Indonesia and Malaysia to political mobilization and organization that did 
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not exclude interaction with foreign doctrinal influences, and not all Islamic ones at that 
(Roff 1967, Geertz 1971, Kessler 1978, Shiraishi 1990, Farish 2004). 
 
 
II. The approach  
 
Against these tendencies, some of the most compelling analyses of Islamic politics have 
addressed the trajectories of socio-economic change in Muslim societies that generated 
tensions and conflicts over the control of resources and the exercise of power – the 
problematic of this article. Consonant with the idea that ‘The study of Islamic communities 
cannot be based on a “sociology of religion” alone [but] must, rather, involve a sociology 
of how religion interacts with other ethnic, cultural and political forces’ (Halliday 1995), 
several single-case and comparative studies have explained the circumstances that made 
some social agents bearing Islamic commitments more influential than others at particular 
junctures (Abrahamian 1991, Colas 2004, Halliday 2000, Hooglund 1992, Khoo 2006, 
Rahnema 2008). Following in this analytical path, we chart the trajectories of Islamic 
politics in Indonesia and Malaysia in relation to four basic factors: 
 
• the changing social bases of Islamic politics 
• capitalism and economic transformation 
• the state and Islamization 
• crises of political economy and a resurgence of Islamic politics. 
 
 
The basic approach allows us to show where and how the Indonesian and Malaysian 
trajectories, from their geneses in the colonial period, have converged or diverged, and with 
what consequences for Islam as an ideological resource for mobilization by state agents and 
their opponents. A second point of comparison is to evaluate how industrialization and 
structural economic transformation from the 1970s have affected the social bases and the 
normative goals of Islamic politics.  A third point is to examine the significance of state-
centred religious authority for Islamic politics and the ideological identification of the state 
with ‘Muslim interests’.  
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Making such comparisons differs significantly from extant comparative studies that 
contrast the paths of Islamic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia. For example, in explaining 
competing discourses of Islamic governance in the two countries, Stark (2004) contrasts the 
purportedly more liberal ideas of their new middle classes with the more rigid notions 
espoused by Wahabi-inspired activists having international links, especially with Saudi 
Arabia. Hamayotsu (2002) traces the tension between Islamic ideals and nationhood. In 
Indonesia, she suggests, nationalist leaders sought to confine Islamic politics to the 
periphery of the political system but failed to prevent Islamic ideas from resurging as a 
threat to the modern nation state. By contrast, nation-building in Malaysia has been more 
successful because the state acted ‘flexibly’ and ‘pragmatically’ as the guardian of Islamic 
ideals (Hamayotsu 2002: 356). These surprisingly rare comparative studies of Islam and 
politics in Indonesia and Malaysia creditably consider how state-civil society relations, 
changing political alliances, and social transformation have affected the ideas of the actors 
of Islamic politics. But their reliance on Islam as the key explanatory variable neglects 
other factors which might better ‘explain how Muslims behave, or how they might/ought to 
behave’ (Halliday 1995: 75; Rodinson 2007).  
 
A summary comparative view of some of those ‘other factors’ as they affected 
Islamic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia should help to clarify the crux of the matter. 
 
First, the direction of Islamic politics was conditioned by many social conflicts of 
post-colonial transition. There were contentions over the position of Islam and its social 
forces in the post-colonial state, but these coincided with the Cold War and violent anti-
communist campaigns. Both the anti-communist massacre of 1965–66 in Indonesia and the 
1948–60 colonial counter-insurgency (‘Emergency’) in Malaysia had long-lasting effects 
on politics, not least by limiting the ideological space open to dissent. From the 1970s, 
moreover, Malaysia and Indonesia rapidly industrialized with consequent changes to class 
structures and the social bases of Islamic politics. A traditional Islamic populism had 
durably grown out of rural and urban petty-bourgeois constituencies of the late colonial 
period, primarily moved to halt the steady decline in their socio-economic position. Now a 
newer populism emerged with the social changes wrought by capitalist transformation. The 
latter has a variegated social base, combining the traditional and somewhat peripheralized 
petty bourgeoisie, working classes denied the avenues of labor and leftwing mobilization, 
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and disgruntled sections of new urban middle classes bearing few liberal antecedents. 
Subjected to state surveillance and periodic suppression, the new Islamic populism 
overwhelmingly operates openly, through political parties, associations and non-
governmental organizations. The espousal of a range of Islamic ideals related to issues of 
social equity and justice, reflecting the interests of a more diverse social base, pits the new 
Islamic populism against the state over the directions, outcomes and quality of economic 
management and political administration. A comparatively rare tendency has developed out 
of these clashes: the resort to terror by small underground groups bent on establishing an 
Islamic state through violence.  
 
Second, the state in Indonesia and Malaysia has functioned as a vehicle of 
development and incubator of domestic capitalist classes. Thus economic policy has been 
variously shaped by statist-nationalist impulses and pro-global market interests. Economic 
policy was buttressed by state revenues from natural resources, including petroleum, but it 
was also influenced by a drive to attract foreign investment into a number of economic 
sectors. From the 1950s to 1970s, state policy was inclined to protect fledgling national 
industries and induce the formation of a domestic bourgeoisie. Its later thrust shifted 
towards closer integration with global markets, especially through export-oriented 
industrialization and the liberalization of banking and finance. Indonesia embarked on this 
shift in the 1980s, Malaysia a decade earlier. In each case, the socio-economic changes, 
inequalities and contentions arising out of expanded opportunities and statist, market-based 
or private paths of capital accumulation re-shaped the social terrain of Islamic politics. 
 
Capitalist transformation affected the relationship between Islam and the state. In 
each country, Islamic identities were reshaped by the colonial legacies of a plural society 
and an ethnic division of labor, the latter being ‘part of a class structure [that] has 
crystallized along ethnic lines’ (Wheelwright 1965: 110). After independence, the state 
claimed a key role in protecting or advancing the socio-cultural position and commercial 
interests of the indigenous ethnic communities, pribumi in Indonesia and bumiputera in 
Malaysia, vis-á-vis domiciled ethnic Chinese capital, and foreign capital. The state has 
performed that role systematically and comprehensively in Malaysia, according to its New 
Economic Policy, but only sporadically and haphazardly in Indonesia, for example via the 
failed ‘Benteng program’ of the 1950s (Robison 1986). Since demography makes 
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‘indigenous’ predominantly ‘Muslim’, promoting bumiputera or pribumi interests has 
effectively harnessed Islamic identities to state political discourse and mobilization, but 
with one critical difference. The Indonesian state and its institutions have been staunchly 
secular but the Malaysian state has itself become an Islamizing agent while retaining 
essentially secular institutions.  
 
More recently, integration with the global economy has stimulated new social 
contradictions. The rise of state-sponsored pribumi and bumiputera oligarchic fortunes – in 
association or rivalry with ethnic Chinese corporate wealth – has changed the tenor of 
public debates over social justice and especially the relative economic deprivation of the 
ummah. Since Reformasi in 1998–99, an aggrandizing advancement of politically powerful 
pribumi or bumiputera interests has been much criticized for their ‘KKN’ – korupsi, kolusi, 
nepotisme (corruption, collusion and nepotism), code for the abuse of state power to enrich 
and protect privileged interests. Indonesia’s Reformasi started earlier in economic collapse 
and ended more dramatically with popular unrest overthrowing Soeharto’s New Order. The 
core of the Malaysian Reformasi was a Malay cultural revolt against the Mahathir regime 
for its persecution of Anwar Ibrahim. Hence, appeals for social justice in the name of Islam 
– specifically its egalitarian ideals and a promise of the rule of the pious – resonate readily 
among the poor, dispossessed and disaffected who have been conditioned to dismiss other 
ideological alternatives. In this socio-political milieu of new state development, capitalist 
transformation and class formation, an array of parties and organisations thus parlay Islam 
as the answer to the degradation of secular rule and democratic politics. 
 
 It may seem paradoxical to maintain a distance from Islam to explain more clearly 
the trajectories of Islamic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia. But this stance is valid: the 
conflicts that delineated the trajectories were not primarily theological ones that flowed 
from Islam itself. Instead, the conflicts, marked by contests for control of power and 
resources, have much in common with the socio-political trajectories of competition 
between coalitions of power that take place in other, ‘non-Muslim’, societies likewise 
subjected to far-reaching capitalist development (Bellin 2002). To that extent, it is 
unsurprising, for example, that a leading representative of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia 
should envision that under an Islamic caliphate, the ‘pious’ would control key economic 
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activities.2 More generally, a number of Islamic-oriented political parties in Indonesia, from 
the 1950s to the present, have oriented their struggles to shifting control over economic 
resources to pribumi, that is, predominantly Muslim, entrepreneurs. Similarly in Malaysia, 
strengthening bumiputera interests has been correlated with empowering the ummah. 
 
 
III. Social bases, colonial legacies and post-colonial transitions 
 
The earliest expressions of Islamic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia emerged in 
the early 20th century. In this era when nascent nationalism addressed the multidimensional 
problems of colonial encroachment, religious identity and economic conflict were 
intricately linked in the first forms of organized Islamic politics.  
 
In Dutch-ruled East Indies, the Sarekat Islam (SI) was the first major mass 
organization. 3 Although it was founded by urban-based petty traders and was ‘modernist’ 
and ‘purist’ in its outlook, SI attracted support from rural Java where traditionally syncretic 
forms of Islam were prevalent. The SI was also supported by members of the Javanese 
nobility whose social status and authority had progressively declined during Dutch rule. 
Interestingly, SI had a distinct Left wing supported by workers in urban transport, 
manufacturing and Dutch-run plantations. This wing broke away to become the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) (McVey 2006) which in the 1920s housed members who identified 
with Islam and communism. Even so, SI was essentially founded as a call to religious 
identity underpinned by the economic grievances of small trading and manufacturing 
interests. The latter was squeezed by increasing Dutch control over key sectors of the 
economy and ethnic-Chinese incursions into the spheres of business in the growing towns 
(especially of coastal Java) previously controlled by the traditional petty bourgeoisie.  
 
In Malaysia, Penang- and Singapore-based Kaum Muda reformist ulama were the 
main actors at the turn of the 20th century. Like their modernist counterparts in Indonesia, 
they attacked customary and ‘superstitious’ accretions to orthodox Islam, and proposed 
‘rationalized formulations of Islamic practice which would better enable them and their 
                                                            
2 Interview with Abdullah Fanani, Hiszbut Tahrir Indonesia, Jakarta, 26 January 2009 
3 The original name of SI was Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association). 
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coreligionists to compete in the modern world’ (Roff 1967: 78).4 As urban Muslims who 
reformulated ‘Islam in response to the economic and social pressures of contemporary life’ 
(Roff 1967: 79), they criticized the Malay traditional aristocracy that had become 
dependent on British rule, which stripped the aristocracy of its other powers but extended 
its authority over religious affairs. Thus was created ‘the concentration of doctrinal and 
administrative religious authority in the hands of a hierarchy of officials directly dependent 
on the sultans for their position and power’ (Roff 1967: 72). For the Kaum Muda, the key 
issues were the loss of Malay political power, the decline of the Malay economy vis-à-vis 
colonial capitalism and an ethnic division of labor that rested on an influx of immigrants 
from China and India.   
 
The Kaum Muda’s modernizing tendency pitted its reformism in ‘direct conflict 
with the state religious authorities on a wide range of ritual, doctrinal, and social questions’ 
(Roff (1967: 78) while its purifying tendency alienated it from the Islam of the Malay 
peasantry. As such, it could not gain influence with the elite; nor did it secure a mass base 
that SI enjoyed before coming under intense colonial repression. Even as the SI was 
superseded in the independence struggle by the communists and secular nationalists (led 
most prominently by Soekarno), it evolved into a political party of the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie. The SI example and its part in the ‘national awakening’ encouraged other 
Islamic organizations and political parties to claim simultaneous allegiances to the ummah 
and to the nation. The Kaum Muda, however, left no such organizational legacy. Still, 
representing the Islamic variant of the ‘hesitant beginnings of Malay nationalism’, a 
‘modernist Muslim reaction against the native rulers’ self-serving control of religion under 
the British’ (Kessler 1978: 23–24), it outlined a template for the Islamic politics of the 
Hizbul Muslimin, Kesatuan Melayu Muda and PAS (Mohamed Nawab 2007: 11). 
 
The paths of Islamic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia had exhibited greater 
divergences by the mid-20th century. Islamic politics in Indonesia came to be expressed 
                                                            
4 If the Kaum Muda in colonial Malaya is typically juxtaposed against the Kaum Tua – ulama who 
represented the traditional, ‘folk’ Islam of the peasantry and who were backed by the nobility– the 
Muhammadiyah in Indonesia is contrasted with the Nahdlatul Ulama, a rival Muslim association that would 
defend the traditional syncretism of the Javanese hinterland.  
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through parties and parliaments but also insurgency, while being structurally incorporated 
into the evolving Malaysian post-colonial state. The colonial-era precedent of centralizing 
authority over religion certainly facilitated this development in Malaysia.  Here too the 
victory of the colonial state over the Malayan Communist Party – always portrayed as a 
‘Chinese’ party – allowed state authority to be effortlessly transferred to a coalition 
(Alliance) headed by a nobility-led political party (United Malays National Organisation, 
UMNO) that was self-consciously Malay and Muslim. Such a situation, suited to Britain’s 
needs, was conducive to America’s as well while the Cold War raged. 
 
However, Indonesia’s 1945–49 war of independence ensured that the development 
of the post-colonial state would be highly a contested process within which different 
representatives of Islamic politics were involved. At one extreme, Islamic politics was 
marked by the rise of the Darul Islam rebellion. Ostensibly launched to establish an Islamic 
state, the insurrection initially owed to the disaffection of independence fighters led by the 
legendary Kartosuwiryo – a former senior official of the Party of the Sarekat Islam 
Indonesia – over the ceding of West Java to the Dutch during diplomatic negotiations to 
end the war. Whether the Darul Islam rebellion was ideologically ill-defined (Van 
Bruinessen 2002), or whether Islam importantly influenced it (McVey 1981), it was 
conclusively defeated by the Indonesian armed forces in 1962. With the rebels cast as 
traitors to the nation, their political heirs were never absorbed into the body politic. Instead, 
they continued a tradition of struggles outside state parameters to advance the social 
position of the ummah – often by underground proselytizing activities, sporadically 
uncovered as those of ‘terror cells’, including lately, as part of the loose Jemaah Islamiyah  
network (ICG 2005). 
 
But the mainstream of Islamic politics in Indonesia was represented by the 
‘modernist’ party, Masyumi and the ‘traditionalist’ and ‘syncretic’ Nahdlatul Ulama.  In the 
1950s, Masyumi sought to advance the interests of pribumi entrepreneurs and, in vain, to 
enshrine Islam as the ideological basis of the state. Importantly, some Masyumi members 
were implicated in ‘half-hearted’ separatist rebellions (Harvey 1977) that expressed the 
grievances of commodity exporters in the ‘outer islands’ who felt undermined by the 
taxation and inflationary economic policies of the central state (Dick 2004). In response, 
Soekarno banned Masyumi in 1960. Masyumi’s political and ideological descendants 
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continued to articulate the interests of an eclipsed old petty bourgeoisie based in small trade 
and manufacturing. They straddled formal (and informal) accommodation and haphazard 
resistance to secular state authority, especially during Soeharto’s long New Order. Many 
ex-Masyumi members were encountered in groups that included Darul Islam-ists. By the 
1980s and 1990s, though, their ideas found support among the new urban poor and middle 
class whose aspirations had grown because of access to modern education. The Nahdlatul 
Ulama, more pliant and ideologically amorphous, drew on the support of the patronage 
networks of rural elites and Islamic clerics mainly in Java and established a more secure 
position through decades of co-operation with the Soekarno and the New Order regimes.  
 
In Malaysia, a critical point of Islamic mobilization came with the formation of 
Persatuan Islam Se-Malaya (Pan-Malayan Islamic Organization, or PMIP) from UMNO’s 
breakaway religious wing. The PMIP embraced former members of the Malay Nationalist 
Party (MNP) and Hizbul Muslimin, the first ‘Islamic party’ in Malaysia, which roughly 
represented the radical strands of Malay nationalism (Kessler 1978: 172, Funston 1980: 87–
91). The party’s nucleus was ‘a number of ulama, imams and conservative nationalists from 
both within and without UMNO’ (Farish 2004: 72–73). PMIP’s social base included the 
rural elite, religious teachers, the peasantry, and the lower ranks of the urban middle class. 
Its cadres were also found among graduates and teachers of the Malay educational stream 
who objected to educational policies that favoured the English-medium schools (Kessler 
1978: 170–71). Moreover, PMIP gained mass support among the peasantry and 
smallholders because the UMNO elites’ new wealth and land acquisition aggravated local 
‘peasant anxieties’ (Kessler 1978: 121, 125). In the first post-independence general election 
of 1959, PMIP won control of two states (Kelantan and Terengganu) out of eleven and 
gained a respectable representation in parliament. Over the next decade, UMNO established 
itself as the party of the nobility, salaried officials, and party functionaries that had 
inherited state power from the British authorities. But as PMIP consolidated its rule in 
Kelantan its leaders became distinctly of ‘urban, petty bourgeois origins’, whose vernacular 
or Islamic education had disqualified them from the regime’s high ranks that, retaining 
colonial, English-oriented, elitist features, were the preserve of an UMNO-linked ‘politico-
administrative bourgeoisie’ (Kessler 1978: 170–71). Later renamed Parti Islam (PAS, or 
Islamic Party), PMIP, became UMNO’s sole serious challenger for Malay-Muslim support. 
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IV. Capitalism and economic transformation 
 
The social transformations engendered by capitalist development shaped the evolution 
of Islamic politics in Malaysia in Indonesia, notably by re-shaping the constituencies that 
were potentially available to it. At independence, the peasantries of both countries were 
locked into subsistence agriculture or unprofitable smallholder cash-cropping at best. 
Pribumi or bumiputera businesses were typically small and unable to penetrate the large-
scale primary commodity sector and the import-export trade dominated by European capital. 
At the level of retail, urban services and small-scale industry, too, pribumi or bumiputera 
businesses lost out to Chinese-owned businesses. To the extent that the post-colonial 
economy in both societies was dualist – having a traditional, rural, agricultural sector and a 
modern, urban, service sector – the former was largely occupied by pribumi or bumiputera 
while the latter was not. Particularly in Malaysia, an ethnic division of labor and structure 
of wealth distribution was erected upon this dualism, creating a society more readily 
amenable to ethnic rather than class interpretations of socio-economic inequalities 
(Puthucheary 1960). Kessler (1978), for example, showed how a land-deprived and 
insecure Malay peasantry supported the PMIP in expressions of class interests and 
frustrations; yet neither class nor party pressed towards open class antagonism. The Malay 
peasantry tellingly played no part in the communist insurrection. Although the division of 
labor in the Dutch East Indies likewise marginalized the pribumi, it did not pre-empt class 
expressions of politics. In the 1960s, the PKI led poor peasant actions ostensibly directed 
against their better-off neighbors (Lyon 1970) and dominated the labor movement (Hadiz 
1997). 
 
However, the class struggle collapsed with the PKI’s destruction in the massacres of 
1965–66 (Roosa 2007) that the army conducted with the aid of many Islamic organizations, 
notably those related to NU, whose elites were distressed by the PKI’s agenda of land 
expropriation. Subsequently, the army-led corps of state officials that took power built an 
authoritarian corporatist political structure based on ideas of the cultural authenticity of 
communitarian, organicist, and state-defined social harmony (Bourchier 1996). Where the 
forces of political Islam were invited to join in, they did so as mere junior partners unable 
to pursue their ideal of an Islamic state. Meanwhile the position occupied by the small but 
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economically significant Chinese minority became more critical. Its big-business 
component increasingly developed cronyistic and rapacious alliances with New Order 
officials. But the Chinese as a community served as a convenient target against which 
popular anger over social inequalities could be re-directed. In the absence of class struggles, 
it became habitual to pit Islamic-inspired notions of social justice against the politically 
vulnerable Chinese community. This tactic of rule exploited old animosities that petty 
bourgeois Muslim traders felt against Chinese businesses considered to have been 
privileged by the Dutch (Sidel 2006). 
 
There was a different dynamic in Malaysia where the state was virtually Malay-
Muslim by being UMNO-dominated. State officials had neither interest in nor need of an 
‘Islamic state’. But they reserved certain religious initiatives and projects for Muslims 
because the Malays were their principal electoral constituency. More importantly, they 
needed to maintain a stable apex of power-sharing between a Malay-led state apparatus, 
domiciled non-Malay capital and foreign capital. As the guardians of Malay-Muslim 
interests, they also had to address rural poverty and the commercial demands of the urban 
petty bourgeoisie. This was undertaken after the ethnic violence of 1969 by launching the 
NEP, a massive social engineering project to dismantle the ethnic division of labor. The 
NEP’s dirigiste directions were capitalist, albeit moved by impulses of ethnic anxieties, 
social democracy and economic nationalism.5 A crucial development took place with a 
push towards export-oriented industrialization (EOI), which pulled young Malay labor from 
rural areas into the factories in urbanized export-processing zones. Landless Malay peasants 
were relocated to state-organized land resettlements in a kind of land reform without the 
expropriation of landowners. Moreover, a massive expansion of public education at all 
levels drew young Malays into schools and tertiary institutions. Most graduates were 
absorbed by an expanding bureaucracy and state enterprise sector. In different ways, the 
state created untold business opportunities for the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial 
Community, the official term for a state-sponsored class of mostly Malay capitalists and 
professionals. Thus were created a large Malay industrial proletariat and a large Malay 
urban middle class. 
 
                                                            
5 Tun Abdul Razak, the NEP’s architect, and a member of the Labour Party when he was a student in the UK, 
was proud to call state intervention a form of ‘nationalist socialism’ (Khoo 2003: 196). 
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What was the effect of these social changes on Islamic politics? As the spatial 
distribution of the Malay population was altered, PAS’s chiefly rural-agricultural base was 
modified, even diminished. Ideologically and programmatically, PAS had no purchase on 
Malay nationalism, not with UMNO driving the NEP – reducing Malay poverty, providing 
educational, training and business opportunities to the Malays, and stringently regulating 
non-Malay (including some foreign) businesses. Nor did it help PAS that UMNO redefined 
the parameters of interethnic relations to privilege Malay culture, language and politics 
distinctly. And when it came to religion, the state safeguarded the preeminence of Islam 
vis-à-vis other religions in the country by expanding and deepening its ‘official’ Islam. 
  
Indonesia’s economic transformation took a more complicated route. The New 
Order broke with Soekarno’s anti-imperialist and Third Wordlist stances and economic 
stagnation and introduced major policies to re-connect the economy with the Western 
powers through infusions of foreign capital and investment. More change followed when 
the oil price increases of 1973–74 provided the state with windfall revenues. Now the state 
began to act as an engine of growth, protecting import substituting industries (ISI) and 
providing largesse that aided giant, largely ethnic Chinese-owned but state connected 
businesses (Robison 1986). This phase of state-directed development lasted a decade before 
declining oil prices compelled Indonesia to conform to the dictates of the emerging 
neoliberal global economy by implementing EOI based on low-wage manufacturing.   
 
The Indonesian social landscape, too, was greatly changed as rapid economic 
growth gave rise to a new urban middle class, a broader working class, and a 
lumpenproletariat sprawled over cities and towns. A predominantly new, Chinese 
bourgeoisie also emerged, as did wealthy families of officialdom. Old petty bourgeois 
animosities redirected at the former later merged with new hostility towards the latter. Thus, 
the potential grew for political Islam to widen its social base by incorporating those who 
became disaffected by the gap between rising aspirations, engendered by the experience of 
modernity, and the limits to social mobility constrained by access to economic resources 
and political power. By the 1980s, in urban slums, for example, mosques had become 
centers of new communal ties (Raillon 1994).  
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In Malaysia, the Malay community’s experiences of far-reaching social change – 
urbanization, land resettlement, proletarianization, education, and embourgeoisment – 
created social tensions that opened new opportunities for Islamic politics. Yet PAS, the 
main representative of Islamic politics, failed to develop a program to compete for the 
support of a transformed Malay community. This was evident, for example, in PAS’s 
attitude towards the growing, young, Malay proletariat (that had a sizeable female 
component) engendered by the EOI of the 1970s. The sole surviving party of the Left, Parti 
Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM, or Malaysian People’s Socialist Party) had tried to 
organize this new Malay Muslim working class based in the MNCs or the new industrial 
zones, but PAS seemed oblivious to their existence. In fact, PAS hardly had a role in the 
initial religious resurgence of the 1970s, which was associated with organizations of the 
new Malay urban middle class, such as the graduate-led, part-dakwah, part-activist and 
part-welfare-oriented Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, or Malaysian Islamic Youth 
Movement). ABIM was influential among urban Malay youth and on university campuses 
where the Malay student population was rapidly rising.6 Another movement, Darul Arqam, 
infused with ‘sufi-millenarian ideals’ (Ahmad Fauzi 2009), attracted graduates of 
university-level Islamic studies programs, professionals and even civil servants to its 
communitarian efforts at building an ‘Islamic society’, grounded in economically self-
supporting settlements (Nagata 1984: 104–106).7 
 
An analogous growth of religious consciousness took place among the Indonesian 
urban middle class of students, engineers, bureaucrats, clerks, lawyers and doctors who – 
like their Malaysian counterparts – were just one or two generations removed from rural 
origins and came to make sense of modernity and globalization in increasingly Islamic 
terms.8 More ambitious and materially comfortable as the world opened up for them, they 
resented the New Order’s rapacity, cronyism and blatant abuse of power that curbed their 
own prospects for upward mobility. But whereas repression could dispense with political 
                                                            
6 Nagata (1984: 91) cited data showing ABIM’s early membership to consist of 32 per cent white-collar office 
workers, 26 per cent teachers, 13 per cent students, 8 per cent self-employed workers, and 21 per cent of 
unspecified occupations. 
7 Darul Arqam was suppressed for being ‘deviationist’ in 1994. Some of its leaders were detained without 
trial for a short while. 
8 For comparisons with the Arab world, see Ayubi (1995). 
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liberalism, it could not ‘eliminate’ Islam culturally and ideologically. In fact, new social 
agents of Islamic politics, especially those nurtured in universities as higher education 
expanded, grew in confidence when Soeharto tried to accommodate them through the 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). Formed in 1990, ICMI quickly 
became a conduit to bureaucratic authority and political largesse (Hefner 1993) and the site 
of further political socialization of a generation of activists that would form a host of post-
New Order Islamic parties. 
 
The above developments occurred in the context of sustained economic growth. In 
Malaysia, revenue from oil and other commodities streamed in with the EOI and the NEP, 
defraying rising state expenditure in the economic and social sectors. Thus, manufacturing 
transformed the economy while social engineering restructured society. Their combined 
outcome, rapid growth with meaningful redistribution, undermined PAS’s challenge. 
Moreover, the state protected international capital by prohibiting the industrial working 
class from unionizing, but mitigated the latter’s overall conditions with social policies and 
welfare measures which, disproportionately benefitting the Malays, secured their allegiance 
more firmly. In Indonesia, living standards generally improved before the 1997 financial 
crisis although largely without welfare-like policies. Even so, the Soeharto government was 
more frequently criticized for presiding over an unjust social order. It was perceived to 
favour a select group of capitalists with strong state connections through non-transparent 
policies, including preferential access to state credit and the creation of private monopolies. 
As the New Order was driven by the interests of a politically insulated politico-business 
oligarchy (Robison and Hadiz 2004), its stringent policies of demobilizing civil society 
prevented any effective anti-regime challenge from emerging until 1998. This was evident 
in the repression of the organizations of the new EOI-based industrial working class (Hadiz 
1997) and the domestication of elements of the new urban middle class through ICMI.9 
 
      An impetus for ICMI’s establishment derived from the growing criticism of the New 
Order in its first two decades made by Muslim groups, especially those informally linked to 
old Masyumi and Darul Islam networks. Such criticism had been previously suppressed. In 
                                                            
9 It must be noted that ICMI primarily incorporated the Muslim intelligentsia and members of the new urban 
Muslim middle class created by capitalist development.  In general, the Darul Islamists, for example, were not 
accommodated. 
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the 1970s, competing Islamic political parties had been forced to merged into one party,  
the PPP (United Development Party), whose name was bereft of anything remotely Islamic  
and which was suitably docile for most of the time.10 A decade later, the state simply 
imposed its ideology of Pancasila11 regardless that some Muslims derided it as a secular 
concoction (Prawiranegara 1984). Further, shadowy groups which the government claimed 
were pursuing the Darul Islam dream of an Islamic state were brutally crushed when they 
surfaced for a short while (Van Bruinessen 2002). Tensions between the New Order and 
political Islam exploded one night in September 1984, in the working class enclave of 
Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. A large crowd of demonstrators, led by one Amir Biki, a 
businessman and former Muslim student activist, had emerged from a mosque where 
sermons allegedly combined with anti-government agitation were heard. Reportedly 
hundreds of the demonstrators, including Biki, were shot dead by units of the Jakarta 
military command (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003: 140). 
 
       Events such as the Tanjung Priok incident compelled many Indonesian Islamic 
activists to go incognito before ICMI’s establishment. For example, in response to strict 
control over student organizations, Muslim groups on university campuses organized 
prayer and other religious activities that led to political discussion and cadre formation. 
From such activities the so-called Tarbiyah (educational) movement emerged, which was 
important in the development of the PKS (Justice and Prosperity Party), the most successful 
of the post-New Order Islamic parties (Rachmat 2008). 
 
 
V. The state and Islamization 
 
The Malaysian and Indonesian cases diverged most significantly on the matter of 
the state and Islamization.  
 
                                                            
10 However, PPP parliamentarians confronted the government when it challenged a 1970s marriage bill that 
they thought contravened Islamic precepts. 
11 Pancasila,  ‘promulgated’ by Soekarno in 1945, placed value on belief in God, humanism, national unity, 
deliberative democracy, and social justice. Potentially, Pancasila was grand and vague enough to 
accommodate Islamists, communists and nationalists.  
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In many Muslim countries, the failure of economic development fuelled the rise of 
Islamism – generally, ideologies and movements seeking socio-political solutions based on 
Islamic ideals. Unlike in other Muslim countries such as Egypt and Algeria, that was not 
the case in Malaysia where state-directed economic transformation enabled the successful 
absorption of rural, mostly Malay-Muslim, migrants within the urban industrial sector 
(Lubeck 1998: 313). Indeed, the Malaysian state did much more to hold back Islamic 
challenges. State policies in the 1980s had shifted the decisive arenas of Malay politics – 
from the countryside to the cities, from culture and language to economy and wealth, from 
peasant agriculture to the corporate sector, and from subsistence and small business to the 
commanding heights of the economy. The power of state enterprises, an emerging class of 
Malay capitalists, and UMNO’s senior leadership had eclipsed the influence of Malay-
medium schoolteachers, ‘men of letters’, civil servants, and low-level religious 
functionaries. Under Mahathir, Malaysia Inc. and privatization benefitted coalitions of 
political influence and financial power that won lucrative state contracts and projects. 
Money and power met and merged, and politics and business fused in UMNO, the ‘party of 
the Malays’. The state managed an ethno-corporatist distribution of material benefits. 
Malay society was awash with state aid – contracts, shares and subsidies for new Malay 
capitalists; resources and funds for state enterprise managers; scholarships, shares, and 
support for professionals; and agricultural, infrastructural and other subsidies for the rural 
population. And, for all Muslims, there were the public construction of houses of worship, 
provision of religious classes, sponsorship of events, media broadcasts of programs on 
Islam, and offers of assistance for the performance of religious duties, including the haj. It 
seemed then that PAS could not mount a credible ‘Islamic alternative’ to those state 
policies. Nor did it appear that Malay society could be mobilized along lines of class 
antagonism, even when its elite captured social policy, intra-ethnic inequalities widened, 
and the lifestyles of Malay rich and poor diverged irreconcilably.  
 
Ironically, if EOI and NEP indirectly held back Islamist challenges, the state itself 
advanced the course of Islamization. Of course, the state has always striven to shape 
‘Muslim consent’, bolster regime legitimacy, and control Islamic dissent, opposition and, 
though rarely, militancy. The state possessed the power, resources and apparatuses to drive 
its own agenda of ‘official’ Islamization. Moreover, there were historical precedents: 
official Islamization in Malaysia, as a process, originated in colonial rule. British rule, by 
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depriving the Malay rulers and traditional elites of power in all areas save ‘Malay religion 
and customs’, concentrated doctrinal and administrative religious authority in the hands of 
officials dependent on the sultans (Roff 1967: 72). For ‘Malay interested parties’, this 
colonial institutionalization of Islamization was ‘an opportunity to extend the reach of 
Sharī‘a prescription (and their own writ)’ (Roff 1998: 213). For two decades the post-
colonial ruling elite maintained a decidedly secular and constitutional – if politically 
illiberal – regime. Their chief agendum was developmental but political and security 
concerns left room for discrete, small-scale and symbolic Islamic projects. These projects 
partly bound Malay allegiance that the state regarded as critical to its management of a 
multiethnic society. They partly affirmed an ideological role for Islam in the state’s 
commitments to the anti-communist side of the Cold War.  
 
From the 1980s, though, the state was as likely to extend as to contain the 
boundaries of Islamic law that weakened the framework of secular government. A critical 
moment came when the Mahathir regime chose to harness Islam to its nationalist-capitalist 
project by adding Islamization – establishment of Islamic institutions such as Bank Islam, 
International Islamic University and an Islamic insurance company –  to its Look East, 
Privatization and Malaysia Incorporated policies. An exhortation to ‘absorb Islamic values’ 
made its way into official documents and events and served an ideological function with 
dual class emphases. ‘Islamic values’ were to imbue the emerging Malay capitalist and 
professional classes with an inoffensive equivalent of a ‘Protestant ethic’, and to impose 
upon the Malay working classes a strong work discipline required for late industrialization 
(Khoo 1995). 
 
Up to that point, the state seemed able to steer the course of Islamization, retain 
secular government, restrain encroachment on the rights of the large proportion of non-
Muslims in the populace, and limit the disapproval of foreign investors (and tourists). But 
Islamization reproduced a growing class of religious bureaucrats and professionals whose 
interests and power lay in de-secularizing public institutions and regulating social life 
(Ahmad Fauzi 2009: 7) beyond the ambit of Mahathir’s own ‘liberal’ and ‘instrumentalist’ 
preferences. Thus, it was never simply that Islamic theology fused state and religion. For 
long periods, they had been separate enough in public affairs and the personal lives of 
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Muslims. But the state having infiltrated religion (Hischkind 1997: 13), religion rebounded 
by percolating through the state. 
 
       Nothing of the sort occurred in Indonesia. Dutch colonialism never had the effect of 
concentrating religious authority on the state (Hefner 2001: 24) so that Indonesian Islam 
could develop diversity and avert codification. The traditional nobilities, especially the 
Javanese ones, continued to represent cultural traditions far more syncretistic than Islamic. 
Their loss of political power was not compensated for by increased religious authority 
under Dutch colonialism. Hence, colonial experience provided no precedent to facilitate the 
incorporation of Islamic politics into the post-colonial state. Although Islam was a major 
pillar of Indonesia’s nascent nationalism, as evident from the SI’s legacy, Islam had to 
compete with many forms of secular populism. Islamic groups having failed to privilege 
Islam in the national constitution (Nasution 1992), Islam was superseded by Soekarno’s 
nationalist populism in the independence struggle. Besides, the PKI reemerged with strong 
grassroots bases in the 1950s, developing a radical populism that threatened the material 
interests of the key rural and urban petty-bourgeois constituencies of Islamic politics. In 
response, the social agents of Islamic politics turned to the military and supported the 
bloody campaign against the communists in the 1960s. 
 
       In the event, the military turned around to curb its erstwhile Muslim allies for a 
clear reason: Islamic forces with strong grassroots would undermine the New Order’s 
founding logic, that is, to undertake capitalist development based on the political 
demobilization of society. Not Islam, then, but a state corporatist version of Pancasila was 
exalted12 – and this, despite the embrace of Islam by an untold number of peasants during 
the late 1960s to escape being branded ‘communist-atheists’, and the state’s efforts to 
create a limited social space for Islamic activists in education by supporting the expansion 
of Islamic traditional schools (Sidel 2006: 51, 53). What Islamic organizational life there 
was, embodied in the PPP, for example, remained as ‘Islamic representation’ within a 
demobilized, state corporatist and rigidly controlled party system (Robison and Hadiz 
2004). Unlike in Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, where gradual Islamization as the state’s Cold 
War, anti-Left and corporatist strategy (Ayubi 1996) allowed Islamists to control trade 
                                                            
12 Indoctrination courses featuring a rigidly bureaucratized Pancasila devoid of traces of its origins in national, 
even revolutionary, struggles were regularly launched for different sections of the populace. 
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unions, the sheer destruction of the Indonesian Left made it unnecessary to Islamize state 
corporatist institutions. 
  
       The arrival of ICMI, under the aegis of Vice President B J Habibie, rekindled hopes for 
creeping Islamization within state institutions. But Habibie’s brief Presidency only deluded 
those representatives of Islamic politics who thought their time had come. Habibie lost the 
1999 elections. Since then, in a newly democratized Indonesia, Islamic political parties 
have had to contend, rather unsuccessfully, with a host of parties that keep alive the 
tradition of secular nationalist politics that Soekarno and Soeharto had nurtured in different 
ways. In the 1999 general election, even the most successful Islamic party, PKS (then 
Partai Keadilan or Justice Party), could not obtain the threshold two per cent of the total 
vote. Reconstituted as the PKS, the party did much better in 2004 and 2009, winning 
between seven and eight per cent. Significantly, the PKS had distanced itself from Sharia 
promotion and emphasized issues of integrity and good governance (Rahmat 2008), 
demonstrating the limited currency of ideas of dismantling the secular state. 
 
 
VI. Crises of political economy and the resurgence of political Islam 
 
A final divergence between the Indonesian and Malaysian trajectories may be 
located in crises of political economy that created opportunities for Islamic politics, though 
these may not always be seized so successfully. 
 
While Mahathir used Islam for the purposes of legitimizing the Malaysian 
capitalist-nationalist project, PAS’s transformation was leading nowhere. In 1986, PAS was 
reduced to a sole seat in Parliament, defeated in 75 out of 76 contests against UMNO. But 
the contradictions of NEP-based capitalism wrought their consequences and the 
Islamization of politics advanced at two moments when the Mahathir regime came close to 
imploding – not because of religious matters but power struggles within UMNO during 
economic recessions that compelled the state to reconstitute the market and Malaysian 
capitalism. Until the late Soeharto period, Indonesia saw a much less systematic attempt to 
use Islam to legitimize the process of economic development since the thorough 
demobilization of civil society made it less likely that economic crisis would destabilize the 
22 
 
New Order. Yet, the crisis of 1997–98 brought down the entire edifice of political 
institutions. As with the end of the Soekarno years, a post-Soeharto environment emerged 
that promised – but did not quite realize – opportunities for the representatives of Islamic 
politics to scale the commanding heights of the state and the economy.  
  
In Malaysia, recession in 1985 had led Mahathir to a pro-market resolve to 
liberalize investment conditions, discipline the state sector, turn to the private sector for 
recovery, and suspend the NEP’s redistribution objective in favour of growth (Khoo 1995). 
Opposed to this position was a pro-state alliance of smaller Malay business interests, civil 
servants, and managers of SOEs (Khoo 1992). The result was a political crisis of Malay 
capitalism. The challenge to Mahathir’s team was narrowly defeated in UMNO’s April 
1987 election but it split the party. Not until 1996 would a breakaway faction concede 
defeat and rejoin the UMNO rump. The 1997 financial crisis found Mahathir leading the 
state’s confrontation with the global financial market, choosing currency and capital 
controls over further liberalization and deregulation. His deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, was 
associated, correctly or not, with the pro-market reforms demanded by foreign investors 
and the money market (Khoo 2003). When Anwar was dismissed from government, 
expelled from UMNO, and imprisoned, popular outrage at his maltreatment spawned the 
Reformasi movement. The politics of the two crises of capitalism convulsed the Malay 
community, loosened UMNO’s hold over its constituency, and discredited institutions of 
state, especially the judiciary, police and bureaucracy. At this juncture of weakened state 
legitimacy, a more effective Islamization of politics truly began.  
 
These crises helped to revive PAS’s electoral fortunes. Split in 1976, PAS quit the 
BN, lost Kelantan to the Federal government under emergency rule, and was defeated in the 
1978 election. In turmoil, the party turned to the ulama – partly trained in foreign centres of 
Islamic learning – who recast the party’s ideology and program in more radical forms. They 
Arabised their political idiom and upheld the universalism of Islam by denouncing 
UMNO’s politics of nasionalisme assabiyah (ethno-nationalism or chauvinism). They 
insisted that an ulama-led system of government would have to replace ‘secularism’ with 
rule by Islamic law. It may not be redundant, thus, to say of PAS that it had Islamized itself. 
All the same, as PAS threw its ‘Islamic state’ gauntlet at UMNO, it did so over economic, 
social and political matters as much as moral and religious ones. 
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Between the two crises, PAS finessed its political deployment of Islam for an anti-
statist project. It mounted an Islamic populist opposition based on an estrangement of a 
middle-class component from the state, demands of moral economy, and a model of pious 
living. During the 1980s, PAS’s Islamist re-orientation won over many Malay students and 
graduates, trained locally and abroad, and urban activists who were Islamizing via dakwah, 
seeking solace from the effects of rapid capitalist development. PAS opposed the 
corruption linked to the state’s non-transparent privatization of ‘mega projects’ to cronies 
and ‘Umnoputras’. By personal example, the top PAS leaders enjoined pious living, pitting 
morality against maksiat (vices) – the corruption, arrogance and decadence – of the tokoh 
korporat and Melayu Baru elite.  In 1990, PAS returned to power in Kelantan in a coalition 
with an UMNO breakaway faction. Nine years later, PAS, with the help of Muslim NGOs 
such as ABIM and Jemaah Islam Malaysia, rode an unprecedented Malay revulsion against 
the Mahathir regime’s maltreatment of Anwar, to regain control of Terengganu and became 
for the first time the leading opposition party in Parliament (Khoo 2003). Today PAS is the 
best-organized component of a three-party coalition that credibly challenges the dominance 
of UMNO/BN in national politics. For PAS and many Muslims, as it has been for the non-
Muslim voters who support PAS and its non-Islamic partners in Pakatan Rakyat (People’s 
Alliance), the political crises of capitalism in the 1980s and the 1990s were shocking 
symptoms of a model of Malay modernization turned moral malaise. 
 
Indonesia too suffered a crisis of political economy in the 1980s, when the fall of oil 
prices robbed the state of its most important financial base, and again in the broader Asian 
Crisis of the following decade, but Islamic political actors gained little from them. No 
doubt, in an otherwise highly orchestrated general election in 1982 (Suryadinata 2002), the 
PPP did benefit from broad-based disenchantment with an increasingly corrupt state, which 
led to a partial backlash against the state’s electoral vehicle, Golkar. But the PPP, along 
with mainstream Islamic organizations and critical groups on the fringes of social and 
political life were largely mute on the issue of economic crisis itself; aside from some NGO 
stalwarts, they contributed little to debates on alternative policies. Yet this crisis led to 
selective ‘deregulation’ of the economy, mainly in trade and finance, and the promotion of 
EOI which signaled a new phase in Indonesia’s incorporation into the global economy.  
Significantly, these policies would give the most politically-connected businesses access to 
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new international sources of finance; in time their borrowings would cause private-sector 
debt to spiral out of control. Consequently, the Indonesian economy fared the worst when 
the Asian Crisis struck (Robison and Rosser 2000). 
 
It was in the latter context that Muhammadiyah leader (and ex-ICMI figure) Amien 
Rais became a public face of Indonesia’s Reformasi, and KAMMI, a student organization 
linked to the Tarbiyah, took a leading role in student demonstrations which emerged when 
it became evident that Soeharto could not navigate Indonesia through its worst crisis. 
Afterwards, however, Islamic political actors did little to distance themselves from the 
corruption and rapacity of New Order elites who prolonged their political lives by 
reinventing themselves as democrats, via old and new political parties (Robison and Hadiz 
2004). The PPP and new parties such as PBR (Reform Star Party) became immersed in 
elite-level wheeling and dealing, punctuated by regular elections and coalition-building that 
had more to do with disbursing the spoils of power than with proper governance for all their 
moralistic rhetoric. Even the PKS – idolized by sections of the upwardly-mobile urban 
middle class –has not been free of power-broking and allegations of corruption. If there has 
been a resurgence of Islamic politics it has occurred in Indonesia, unlike in Malaysia, 
without a true party of the pious.  
 
Though modest, the PKS’s electoral success can be taken as an indicator of this 
resurgence. Other indications come from such developments as Sharia-inspired local 
government ordinances that would regulate such matters as women’s dress, but typically 
fail to address matters like corruption. The resurgence has been manifest, too, in the 
emergence of paramilitary organizations that deploy Islamic symbols and claim to protect 
the ummah from vice but are in fact manned by a multitude of street thugs (Van Bruinessen 
2002). Among these organizations are the FPI (Islamic Defenders’ Front),  the FBR 
(Betawi Brotherhood Front) in Jakarta, and the Korps Hisbullah of Central Java, all known 
for conducting raids on night spots. In truth, such organizations can potentially draw large 
numbers of recruits from the sprawling lumpenproletariat of Indonesia’s crowded and 
tough urban centres, where unemployment and underemployment remain rampant more 
than a decade after the economic crisis that claimed Soeharto. There is also the Yogyakarta-
based Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, a front organization for a range of Islamic political 
actors, including Darul Islamists, who bore the brunt of state repression in the 1980s and 
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were not absorbed into ICMI. Yet, all this is also indicative of the failure of the social 
agents of Islamic politics in Indonesia to mount a serious challenge for dominance over the 
higher reaches of state power and the economy: none can compare with the stature and 
credibility of PAS in Malaysian politics today.  
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This essay made historically informed connections between Islamic politics and 
political economy to explain how trajectories of the former have reached quite different 
positions in Indonesia and Malaysia. The analytical result is a complex picture that defies 
easy assumptions about how political Islam has developed in either country, or may 
develop in any other. 
 
Early political Islam in Indonesia had strong organization and substantial aims. Yet, 
overshadowed by state secularism and demobilized by brutal authoritarianism, no Islamic 
force emerged as a credible challenger for state power even when a crisis of capitalism 
produced mass dissent that replaced Soeharto’s New Order with new parameters of formal 
political contestation. The beginnings of political Islam in Malaysia were marked by 
weaker organization and milder political tones. Yet, its principal bearer, PAS, although 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis a ‘Malay-Muslim state’ that launched socio-economic reform and 
imposed official Islamization, surged by seizing chances created at two moments of the 
ruling party’s near-implosion. These divergences in trajectories may be traced to processes 
of state and capitalist transformation that reshaped the social bases of political contestation. 
Only when such processes and factors external to Islam as religion are taken into account 
does the rise of Islamic politics that combines populist mobilization with religious idioms 
and goals become comprehensible. 
 
To explain political Islam in these neighboring Southeast Asian countries in such 
terms is not fundamentally different from treating political Islam elsewhere. As in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Iran, or Pakistan – the political appeal of Islam and the power of Islamic 
populism cannot be separated from issues of post-colonial state transformation, pathways of 
capitalist development, and the destruction of ideological alternatives. The contexts are 
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comparable, even if historical peculiarities and local specificities add to the complexities of 
particular situations, as in Southern Philippines or Southern Thailand today. There, one 
must add the unresolved problems of severe regional inequalities, antagonistic state-
Muslim minority relations, and subordinate social identities to see how ‘jihadism’ is such a 
terrible misnomer for political struggles rooted in unfulfilled socio-political aspirations. 
 
Where new forms of Islamic populism threaten ‘secularism’, in Indonesia, Malaysia 
or elsewhere, it is not the foreignness of the idea of secular government or its ‘alleged 
unintelligibility to the “Islamic masses”’ that matters, but typically a regime’s economic 
mismanagement, social failures and political implosions (Azmy Bishara 1995). Nothing in 
this reasoning vulgarizes Islamic politics as an epiphenomenon of economics: it is accepted 
that the devout and pious may view social problems in religious terms and seek religious 
solutions to them. But, precisely because Islam, ‘like all great religions, [has] a reserve of 
values, symbols and ideas from which it is possible to derive a contemporary politics and 
social code’ (Halliday 2000: 133), Islamic politics cannot be divorced from the 
contemporary and secular needs of those who articulate variants of that politics. To do so is 
to commit the common error of representing Islamic politics as a phenomenon that flows, 
as it were, from the religion of Islam itself. Here, hostile portrayal would depict Islamic 
politics as a defective outgrowth of a flawed religion. Conversely, idealized rendering 
would praise Islamic politics as an activity enjoined by a perfect religion. Avoiding those 
two sides of the same coin, it is necessary to see, as Armstrong (2000: 133) has succinctly 
expressed it, that the special character of Islamic resurgence lies in its political exertion, not 
so much its doctrinal reassertion. 
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